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Abstract: Control reserves are power generation or consumption entities that ensure balance
of supply and demand of electricity in real-time. In many countries, they are operated through
a market mechanism in which entities provide bids. The system operator determines the
accepted bids based on an optimization algorithm. We develop the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) mechanism for these electricity markets. We show that all advantages of the VCG
mechanism including incentive compatibility of the equilibria and efficiency of the outcome
can be guaranteed in these markets. Furthermore, we derive conditions to ensure collusion and
shill bidding are not profitable. Our results are verified with numerical examples.
Keywords: Electrical networks, game theory, optimization, control reserves.
1. INTRODUCTION
The liberalization of electricity markets leads to opportu-
nities and challenges for ensuring stability and efficiency of
the power grid. For a stable grid, the supply and demand
of electricity at all times need to be balanced. This instan-
taneous balance is reflected in the grid frequency. Whereas
scheduling (yearly, day-ahead) is based on forecast supply
and demand of power, the control reserves (also referred to
as ancillary services) provide additional controllability to
balance supply and demand of power in real-time. With
increasing volatile renewable sources of energy, the need
for control reserves also has increased. This motivates
analysis and design of optimization algorithms and market
mechanisms that procure these reserves.
The objective of this paper is a game theoretic explo-
ration of an alternative market mechanism for the control
reserves with potential improvements. To further discuss
this, we briefly discuss relevant features of the existing
market mechanism. Control reserves are categorized as
primary, secondary, and tertiary. Primary reserves balance
frequency deviations in timescale of seconds. Secondary
reserves balance the deviations on a timescale of seconds to
minutes not resolved by primary control. Tertiary reserves
restore secondary reserves and typically act 15 minutes
after a disturbance to frequency. The secondary and ter-
tiary control reserves in several countries are procured
in a market. In the Swiss market for example, the auc-
tion mechanism implemented by the Transmission System
Operator (TSO) minimizes the cost of procurement of
required amounts of power, given bids (Abbaspourtorbati
and Zima, 2016).
? This work is partially funded under M. Kamgarpour’s European
Union ERC Starting Grant CONENE.
In a pay-as-bid mechanism, since payments to winners
are equal to their bid prices, a rational player may over-
bid to ensure profit. As an alternative to pay-as-bid, we
explore the Vickrey Clarke Groves (VCG) mechanism.
This is one of the most prominent auction mechanisms.
The first analysis of the VCG mechanism was carried out
by (Vickrey, 1961) for the sale of a single item. This work
was subsequently generalized to multiple items by (Clarke,
1971) and (Groves, 1973).
It has been shown that the VCG mechanism is the only
mechanism that possesses efficiency and incentive com-
patibility. Efficiency implies that goods are exchanged be-
tween buyers and sellers in a way that creates maximal
social value. Incentive compatibility means that it is opti-
mal for each participant to bid their true value. Variants
of the VCG mechanism have been successfully deployed
generating billions of dollars in Spectrum auctions, for
instance, in the 2012 UK spectrum auction (Cramton,
2013; Day and Cramton, 2012) and in advertising, for
instance, by Facebook 1 (Varian and Harris, 2014). For
further discussion on the VCG mechanism and its appli-
cation to real auctions we recommend (Milgrom, 2004;
Klemperer, 2004).
Investigation must be performed before applying the VCG
mechanism. As outlined in the paper of Ausubel and Mil-
grom (Ausubel et al., 2006), coalitions of participants can
influence the auction in order to obtain higher collective
profit. These peculiarities occur when the outcome of the
auction is not in the core. The core is a solution concept in
coalition game theory where prices are distributed so that
there is no incentive for participants to leave the coalition
(Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994). This has recently moti-
1 https://developers.facebook.com/docs/marketing-api/pacing
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vated the study and application of VCG auctions where
the outcome is projected to the core (Cramton, 2013;
Abhishek and Hajek, 2012).
The electricity market can be thought of as a reverse
auction. In contrast to an auction with multiple goods,
in an electricity market, each participant can bid for
continuum values of power. Furthermore, to clear this
market, certain constraints, such as balance of supply and
demand and network constraints need to be guaranteed.
Due to the differences between an electricity market and an
auction mechanism for multiple items (such as spectrum
or adverts), there are conceptual and theoretical advances
in VCG mechanism that need to be analyzed.
In this paper, we apply the VCG mechanism to control
reserve markets and provide a mathematically rigorous
analysis of it. We show that efficiency and incentive
compatibility of the VCG mechanism will hold even in
the case of stochastic markets, see Theorem 1. On the
other hand, we provide examples where shill bidding
might occur. The remainder of the paper develops ways
to resolve this issue. In particular, building upon a series
of results based on coalitional game theory, in Theorem
4 we show how a simple pay-off monotonicity condition
removes incentives for shill bidding and other collusions.
The proofs developed significantly simplify the arguments
of Ausubel and Milgrom (Ausubel et al., 2006).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we in-
troduce the VCG mechanism for control reserve markets,
analyzing its positive and negative aspects. Throughout
Section 3 we investigate conditions that can mitigate these
problems making the mechanism competitive. We con-
clude with specific simulations based on data available
from Swissgrid (the Swiss TSO) showing the applicability
of VCG mechanism to the Swiss ancillary service market.
2. ELECTRICITY AUCTION MARKET SETUP
We briefly describe the control reserve market of Switzer-
land. The formulation and results derived are generalizable
to alternative markets, with similar features as will be
discussed. The Swiss system operator (TSO), Swissgrid,
procures secondary and tertiary reserves in its reserves
markets. These consist of a weekly market where secondary
reserves are procured and daily markets where both sec-
ondary and tertiary reserves are procured. Each market
participant submits a bid that consists of a price per unit
of power (CHF/MW, swiss franc per megawatt) and a
volume of power which it can supply (MW). Offers are
indivisible and thus, must be accepted entirely or rejected.
Moreover, conditional offers are accepted. This means that
a participant can offer a set of bids, of which only one can
be accepted. If an offer is accepted, the participant is paid
for its availability irrespective of whether these reserves are
deployed (an additional payment is made in case of deploy-
ment). This availability payment, under the current swiss
reserve market, is pay-as-bid. An extensive description of
the Swiss Ancillary market is given in (Abbaspourtorbati
and Zima, 2016).
We abstract the control reserve market summarized above
as follows. Let L denote the set of auction participants
and |L| = N . Let Bj = (cj , pj) be all the bids placed by
participant j, where pj ∈ Rnj is the vector of power sup-
plies offered (MW) and cj ∈ Rnj are their corresponding
requested costs (or prices). Here nj is the number of bids
from participant j. Let B = {Bj , j ∈ L} be the set of
all bids and n =
∑n
j=1 nj . Given a set B, a mechanism
defines which bids are accepted with a choice function,
f(B) ∈ {0, 1}n and a payment to each participant, pay-
ment rule qj(B). The utility of participant j is hence
uj(B) = qj(B)− c¯>j fj(B), (1)
where c¯j ∈ Rnj is participant j’s true cost of providing the
offered power pj and fj(B) ∈ {0, 1}nj is the binary vector
indicating his accepted bids.
The transmission system operator’s objective function is
J(x, y;B) = c>x+D(x, y).
The variable x ∈ {0, 1}n selects the accepted bids, y ∈ Rp
can be any additional variables entering the TSO’s opti-
mization and D : {0, 1}n × Rp → R is a general function.
In most electricity market, the objective is to minimize the
cost of procurement subject to some constraints:
J?(B) = min
x,y
J(x, y;B) s.t. g(x, y, p) ≤ 0 (2a)
x?(B) = argmin
x
{
min
y:g(x,y,p)≤0
J(x, y;B)
}
(2b)
The above constraints correspond to procurement of the
required amounts of power, e.g. in the Swiss reserve
markets accepted reserves must have a deficit probability
of less than 0.2%. We let X be the feasible values of x for
this optimization. The optimization defines a general class
of models, where the cost function is affine in c and the
prices of bids do not enter the constraints.
2.1 The pay-as-bid mechanism
In the current pay-as-bid mechanism we recognize:
f(B) = x?(B)
qj(B) = c
>
j x
?
j (B), j ∈ L.
It follows that each participant’s utility is uj(B) = (cj −
c¯j)
>x?j (B). As such, rational participants would bid more
than their true values to make profit. Consequently, under
pay-as-bid, the TSO attempts to minimize inflated bids
rather than true costs. Thus, pay-as-bid cannot guarantee
power reserves are procured cost effectively.
2.2 The VCG mechanism
The VCG mechanism is characterized with the same choice
function as the pay-as-bid mechanism but a different
payment rule.
Definition 1. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) choice
function and payment rule are defined as:
f(B) = argmin
x∈X
J(x, y;B) = x?(B),
qj(B) = h(B
−j)− (J?(B)− c>j x?j (B)) ∀j ∈ L,
where B−j denotes the vector of bids placed by all par-
ticipants excluding j. The function h must be carefully
chosen to make the mechanism meaningful. Namely, we
require that payments go from the TSO to power plants,
positive transfers, and that power plants will not face
negative utilities participating to such auctions, individual
rationality. A particular choice of h is the Clarke pivot-
rule, which minimizes the procurement cost given all bids
excluding j’s:
h(B−j) = J?(B−j).
A set of bids B = {Bj , j ∈ L} is a dominant-strategy Nash
equilibrium if for each participant j,
uj(Bj , B
−j) ≥ uj(B˜j , B−j) ∀B˜j ,∀B−j .
Moreover, a dominant-strategy equilibrium is incentive
compatible if Bj = (c¯j , pj) where c¯j is the true cost of
power pj , as given in (1). That is, each participant finds it
more profitable to bid truthfully Bj , rather than any other
vector B˜j , regardless of other participants’ bids. Hence, all
the bidding strategies are dominated by strategy Bj .
The following theorem summarizes the contributions of
(Vickrey, 1961), (Clarke, 1971) and (Groves, 1973) in de-
signing the VCG mechanism. In our proof, we are mind-
ful of the slightly non-standard setting of the electrical
markets: that auctions are “reverse-auctions”, i.e. with a
single buyer and many sellers, and that constraints in the
optimization problem may be non-standard.
Theorem 1. Given the clearing model of (2).
a) The energy procurement auction under VCG choice
function and payment rule is a Dominant-Strategy
Incentive-Compatible (D.S.I.C) mechanism.
b) The VCG outcomes are efficient, that is, the sum of all
the utilities is maximized.
c) The Clarke pivot rule ensures positive transfers and
individual rationality.
Proof. a) We distinguish between the participant j plac-
ing a generic bid B˜j = (cj , pj) and biding truthfully
B¯j = (c¯j , pj). For B˜ = (B˜j , B
−j), substituting the VCG
choice function and payment rule with J?(B˜) as in (2):
uj(B˜) = h(B
−j)−(∑
i 6=j
c>i x
?
i (B˜) + c¯
>
j x
?
j (B˜) +D(x
?(B˜), y?(B˜))
)
,
where the term in brackets is the cost J of (x?(B˜), y?(B˜))
but evaluated at (B¯j , B
−j). For B¯ = (B¯j , B−j), however,
uj(B¯) = h(B
−j)− J?(B¯). Note that
J∗(B¯) ≤ (∑
i 6=j
c>i x
?
i (B˜) + c¯
>
j x
?
j (B˜) +D(x
?(B˜), y?
We then have uj(B¯) ≥ uj(B˜) because (x?(B˜), y?(B˜)) is a
feasible suboptimal allocation for the available bids B¯.
b) Let u0(B) denote the utility gained by the TSO, that
is, u0(B) = −
(∑N
j=1 qj(B) +D(x
?(B), y?(B))
)
. By Def-
inition (1) and incentive compatibility, qj(B) = uj(B) +
c>j x
?
j (B). We then have: u0(B) = −J?(B)−
∑N
j=1 uj(B).
Hence,
∑N
j=0 uj(B) = −J?(B), which is maximized by the
clearing model (2).
c) This can be easily verified substituting h(B−j):
qj(B) = J
?(B−j)− (J?(B)− c>j x?j (B))
= c>j x
?
j (B) +
(
J?(B−j)− J?(B)) ≥ 0 ∀B,
uj(B) = J
?(B−j)− J?(B) ≥ 0 ∀B. (3)
2
In summary, all producers have incentive to reveal their
true values for price of power in a VCG market. Thus, it
becomes easier for entities to enter the auction, without
spending resources in computing optimal bidding strate-
gies. This can help in achieving market liberalization
objectives. Moreover, from the above theorem it follows
that the winners of the auctions are the producers with
the lowest true values. This is because participants bid
truthfully and the VCG choice function minimizes the cost
of the accepted bids.
Note that the result above are very general. We do not
need to assume any particular form for the term D and the
constraints g. Furthermore, using the exact same approach
in the proof, we can state the exact same theorem for
the case in which the participants provide continuous bid
curves: ci : Pi → R+, where Pi ⊂ R+. The difference is
only in notation; we use p?i for the optimal bid accepted
from player i instead of the binary variables x?.
So, there are persuasive arguments for considering VCG
market for control reserves. However, there are potential
disadvantages that must be eliminated.
Example 1. Suppose the TSO has to procure 800 MW
from PowerPlant1, PP1, who bids 40
′000 CHF for 800
MW, and PowerPlant2, PP2, who bids 50
′000 CHF for
800 MW. Under the VCG mechanism, PowerPlant1 wins
the auction receiving a payment of 50′000 CHF. Suppose
now that power plants PP3, PP4, PP5 and PP6 entered the
auction each bidding 0 CHF for 200 MW. Clearly, the new
entrants become winners and each of them would receive
a VCG payment of 40′000 CHF.
This example shows that: (a) producers with very low
prices (in this case 0 CHF) could receive very high pay-
ments; (b) collusion or shill bidding can increase partici-
pants’ profits. In fact, PP3, PP4, PP5 and PP6 could be
a group of losers who jointly lowered their bids to win
the auction, or they could represent multiple identities of
the same losing participant (i.e. a power plant with true
value greater than 40’000 CHF for 800 MW). Entering the
auction with four shills, however, this participant would
have received a payment of 4×40’000 CHF.
Our goal is now to derive conditions that make VCG out-
comes competitive and prevent shill bidding or collusion.
3. SOLUTION APPROACH FOR VCG MARKET
In coalition game theory, the core is the set of allocations
of goods that cannot be improved upon by the formation
of coalitions. (Ausubel et al., 2006) identify conditions for
a VCG outcome to lie in the core. Following their analysis
we derive conditions for core outcomes in our setting
and provide new simpler proofs relevant to our problem
formulation that show that shill bidding and collusion
can be eliminated from certain class of electricity markets
under the VCG mechanism.
Given a game where L is the set of participants, let w
denote the coalitional value function
w(S) =
{−J?(S) if 0 ∈ S ⊆ L
0 if 0 /∈ S ⊆ L .
This function provides the optimal objective function, for
any subset of participants S that includes the TSO. Here,
J?(S) is the cost the TSO incurs for the VCG outcome
with participants S. That is, J?(S) is the solution to
optimization (2) with cj = c¯j for all j, and with additional
constraints that xj = 0nj×1 for all j /∈ S. Clearly J?(S) ≤
J?(S′) for S′ ⊂ S since increasing participation reduces
costs. We thus let (L,w) represent the coalition game
associated with the auction.
Definition 2. The Core(L,w) is defined as follows{
u ∈ Rn+1 |
N∑
j=0
uj = −J?(L), w(S) ≤
∑
j∈S
uj ∀S ⊆ L
}
.
The core is thus the set of all the feasible outcomes, coming
from an efficient mechanism (first equality above), that are
unblocked by any coalition (the inequality). We say that
an outcome is competitive if it lies in the core; that is,
there is no incentive for forming coalitions. In the previous
example, the outcome was not competitive because it was
blocked by coalition {0, 1}. PowerPlant1 was offering only
40’000 CHF for the total amount of 800 MW. It will be
also shown in Theorem 4 that core outcomes eliminate any
incentives for collusions and shill bidding.
3.1 Ensuring core payments
Since core outcome is a competitive outcome, we inves-
tigate under which conditions the outcomes of the VCG
mechanism applied to the control reserve market will be
in the core. Note that there are 2L constraints that define
a core outcome. Our first Lemma provides an equivalent
characterization of the core with significantly lower num-
ber of constraints.
Lemma 1. Given a VCG auction (L,w), let u = [u0 . . . uN ]
be its outcome and W ⊆ L the corresponding win-
ners. Assuming participants revealed their true values,
[u0 . . . uN ] ∈ Core(L,w) if and only if, ∀K ⊆W ,∑
j∈K
(
J?(L−j)− J?(L)) ≤ J?(L \K)− J?(L). (4)
Proof. Core constraints with 0 /∈ S are immediately
satisfied as uj ≥ 0 (individual rationality, Theorem 1c).
Now, u is unblocked by any 0 ∈ S ⊆ L ⇐⇒ −J?(S) ≤∑
j∈S\0 uj + u0 =
∑
j∈S\0 uj −
∑
j∈W uj − J?(L) (since
u0 = −J?(L) −
∑
j∈W uj is the outcome with L partic-
ipants). Thus,
∑
j∈W\S uj ≤ J?(S) − J?(L). Moreover,
fixingK = W\S, the dominant constraints are those corre-
sponding to minimal J?(S), in particular, when S = L\K
(this being maximal set with K not taking part in the
coalition S). Finally recall from (3) that, under the VCG
mechanism, uj = J
?(L−j)− J?(L). 2
The following definition and theorem act over subsets
of participants. Here, we imagine that there is a set of
potential participants Z and, for each subset L of Z,
we consider whether the outcome of the auction with L
participants lies in the core.
Definition 3. Participant j ∈ Z displays payoff mono-
tonicity if ∀0 ∈ S ⊆ S′ ⊆ Z,
uj(S
′)=J?(S′−j)−J?(S′)≤J?(S−j)−J?(S)=uj(S) (5)
Theorem 2. The outcome of the VCG auction (L,w) lies
in the core for all L ⊆ Z if and only if payoff monotonicity
holds for each participant in Z.
Proof. To prove that payoff monotonicity is sufficient
for u to lie in the core, we prove that (4) holds. Let
K = {j1 . . . jk}. Considering
∑
j∈K
(
J?(L−j)− J?(L)),
we notice that: J?(L−j1) − J?(L) ≤ J?(L \ K) −
J?(L−{j2,...,jk}) since j1 displays payoff monotonicity over
S = L−{j2,...,jk} ⊆ L = S′; we also have J?(L−j2) −
J?(L) ≤ J?(L−{j2,...,jk}) − J?(L−{j3,...,jk}) since j2 dis-
plays payoff monotonicity over S = L−{j3,...,jk} ⊆ L =
S′. We can continue with the same considerations up to
J?(L−jk−1) − J?(L) ≤ J?(L−{jk−1,jk}) − J?(L−jk) since
jk−1 displays payoff monotonicity over S = L−jk ⊆ L =
S′. Therefore,
∑
j∈K J
?(L−j) − J?(L) ≤ J?(L \ K) −
J?(L−{j2,...,jk}) + J?(L−{j2,...,jk}) + · · · − J?(L) = J?(L \
K) − J?(L). This same argument holds for any subset of
participants L and ∀K ⊆ W . Thus (4) holds and so, by
Lemma 1, the VCG outcome belongs to the core.
To prove that payoff monotonicity is also necessary for
outcomes to lie in the core, suppose that j does not display
payoff monotonicity. Then, there exist sets S,S′ where (5)
does not hold. We may chose S′ = S ∪ {i} for some i. To
see this, take S = S0 and Sk = S ∪ {jk} with Sκ = S′,
then, since payoff monotonicity does not hold,
κ∑
k=1
J?(S−jk )− J?(S−jk−1) = J?(S′−j)− J?(S−j) (6)
> J?(S′)− J?(S) =
κ∑
k=1
J?(Sk)− J?(Sk−1).
The strict inequality above must hold for one of the
summands J?(S−jk ) − J?(S−jk−1) > J?(Sk) − J?(Sk−1).
So we may consider sets S ⊆ S′ that differ by one
participant, say i. Let S′ and S be the minimal such sets.
By minimality, uj(S
′) = J?(S′−j) − J?(S′) > J?(S−j) −
J?(S) ≥ J?(S′−i−j)−J?(S′−i) ≥ 0 for i ∈ S′ \S. Further,
after rearranging the above inequality we see that ui(S
′) =
J?(S′−i) − J?(S′) > J?(S′−i−j) − J?(S′−j) ≥ 0. That is
both participant i and j are winners of the VCG auction
with participants S′ (instead of L). Then, considering
Lemma 1 for the auction (S′, w) with i, j ∈ W , and K =
{i, j}, we have: ∑j′∈K J?(S′−j′)− J?(S′) > J?(S′−j−i)−
J?(S′−i) +J?(S′−i)−J?(S′) = J?(S′ \K)−J?(S′). Thus
(4) does not hold since the outcome u(S′) is blocked by
coalition S′ \K. 2
Whether a VCG outcome is competitive hence depends on
a particular property of the optimal cost J?. Namely, J?
has to make (5) hold for each j. Note that a similar result
was proven in (Ausubel et al., 2006), for a sale auction of
a finite number of objects, without any constraints. Our
result generalizes this to markets with continuous goods
and arbitrary social planner objectives of the form (2).
3.2 Single stage electricity procurement auction
The class of auctions cleared by (2) is very general and
suitable for mechanisms with multiple stages of decisions.
We will see, in fact, how the two-stages Swiss clearing
model described in (Abbaspourtorbati and Zima, 2016)
can be abstracted as in (2). But first, we start considering
simpler auctions, characterized by single-stage decisions.
More specifically, energy procurement auctions where the
TSO has to procure a fixed amount of M MW, subject to
conditional offer constraints. Hence, we consider auctions
cleared by:
J?(S) = min
x
∑
j∈S
c>j xj (7a)
s.t.
∑
j∈S
p>j xj ≥M,
1>nj×1xj ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ S
Note that the last constraint above ensures that each
bidder can only have one offer accepted. We further
suppose that the power offered by participants is equally
spaced by some increment m, which is a divisor of M and
is chosen by the TSO:
each j bids on power offers p
(k)
j = km, k ∈ Z. (7b)
The model above is a simple clearing model within class
(2). We can now derive conditions on participants’ bids
to ensure pay-off monotonicity, condition (5), is satisfied.
Thus, we derive conditions under which the outcome of
auctions cleared by (7a), (7b) would lie in the core.
Theorem 3. Given (7a), (7b) if p
(b)
j −p(a)j = p(d)j −p(c)j > 0
with 0 ≤ p(a)j < p(c)j implies that
c
(d)
j − c(c)j > c(b)j − c(a)j (8)
for each j ∈ Z, then bidders satisfy payoff monotonicity
condition (5) under the VCG payment rule.
In words, marginally increasing cost condition (8) implies
core outcomes, and thus eliminates incentives for collu-
sions. Condition (8) is visualized in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. Bids in Bj satisfying condition (8).
To prove that condition (8) is sufficient for payoff mono-
tonicity, the following Lemma is needed.
Lemma 2. Under clearing model (7), for an auction with
participants S and S′ = S∪{i} with corresponding optimal
power allocations p and p′, condition (8) implies that
∀j ∈ S, p′j ≤ pj .
In the following proofs we apply the notation that if pj is
the accepted power allocation from bidder j ∈ S, then c(pj)j
is the associated cost bid from j. If the accepted allocation
is zero, we define c
(0)
j = 0.
Proof. The proof follows by contradiction. That is, we
will show that when p′ is such that p′j > pj , for some j ∈ S
then p′ can be modified to provide a lower cost allocation,
q, for participants S (thus contradicting optimality of p).
First, we notice that since bids are equally spaced by m
MW (7b) and satisfy condition (8), it is never optimal to
accept more than M MW (
∑
j∈S pj =
∑
j∈S′ p
′
j = M).
Now, assume p′ is such that p′j > pj , for some j ∈ S.
In order to procure exactly M MW, some participants’
accepted MWs must decrease, that is, the set K = {j ∈
S | p′j < pj} is non-empty. Consider a feasible allocation
q′ for the auction with S′ participants where M units of
power are procured and
q′j =

p′i, for j = i
pj , for j ∈ S\K
q′j for j ∈ K where p′j ≤ q′j ≤ pj
So, q′ is constructed from p′ by transferring m′ =∑
i∈S\K p
′
j−pj units of power from participants in S\K to
participants in K. In doing so, the inequality p′j ≤ q′j ≤ pj
can be maintained:
m′ ≤
∑
j∈K
(pj − p′j).
The above inequality holds because when summing over
j ∈ S, pj ’s sums to M and p′j ’s sums to M − pi.
Since p′ is optimal for participants S′ and q′ is not:
J?(S′) =c(p
′
i)
i +
∑
j∈S\K
c
(p′j)
j +
∑
j∈K
cj
(p′j)
≤c(p′i)i +
∑
j∈S\K
c
(pj)
j +
∑
j∈K
c
(q′j)
j = J(q
′), (9)
where we used J(q′) as a short-hand-notation for the cost
corresponding to choosing q′ bids.
Now, we use (8) to replace the summations over K in (9).
In particular, define q = (qj : j ∈ S) so that
qj := pj + (p
′
j − q′j) =
{
p′j for j ∈ S\K,
pj + p
′
j − q′j for j ∈ K.
Note that q is feasible since p′ and q′ have the same sum
over S (and thus cancel) and pj is feasible. Further, since
(qj − pj) = (p′j − q′j), by condition (8):∑
j∈K
c
(qj)
j − c
(p′j)
j <
∑
j∈K
c
(pj)
j − c
(q′j)
j . (10)
Adding (10) to both side of (9) (and canceling c
(p′i)
i ) gives
J(q) =
∑
j∈S\K
c
(p′j)
j +
∑
j∈K
c
(qj)
j
<
∑
j∈S\K
c
(pj)
j +
∑
j∈K
c
(pj)
j = J
?(S),
which contradicts the optimality of p. 2
A consequence of the above Lemma is that given the op-
timal allocation to procure M MW, for any lower amount
of MWs (while being multiple of m) to be procured, the
total MWs accepted from each participant never increases.
Now, we are ready to prove Theorem 3.
Proof. We prove that under condition (8), inequality (5)
holds for each j, for any S ⊆ S′ = {S, i} with i being a
generic new entered participant. Since S is a generic set
and i can be any new participant, this is sufficient to prove
that the payoffs are monotonic over all the possible couple
of sets (the generalization to arbitrary sets S′ ⊇ S can
then be achieved by the interpolating sums, as was done
in (6)). We adopt the same notation used in Lemma 2 and
we identify with W ⊆ S the set of winners.
For each j /∈ W we have by definition pj = 0. Thus 0 =
J?(S−j)−J?(S), (since the optimal solution is unchanged
when j is removed from S). By Lemma 2, p′j = 0 and so
0 = J?(S′)−J?(S′) also. Thus, payoff monotonicity holds
for j /∈W : 0 = J?(S′−j)− J?(S′) ≤ J?(S−j)− J?(S) = 0
for S′ = {S, i}. This says that a loser of the auction cannot
become a winner as more participants enter.
For each winning participant, w ∈W , recall that uw(S) =
J?(S−w)−J?(S). Adopting the same notation of Lemma 2,
we can indicate it as:
uw(S) := −c(pw)w +
∑
j∈S\w
(c
(%j)
j − c(pj)j )
where %j are the optimal amounts to be accepted from
j ∈ S−w, when w exits the auction. By Lemma 2, in fact,
%j ≥ pj . Similarly, after participant i enters the auction,
uw(S
′) = J?(S′−w)− J?(S′). That is,
uw(S
′) := −c(p′w)w +
∑
j∈S\w
(c
(%′j)
j − c
(p′j)
j ) + c
(%′i)
i − c(p
′
i)
i ,
where %′i are the amounts accepted from j ∈ S′−w when w
exits the new auction. By Lemma 2, we again have %′j ≥ p′j .
Notice that so far we applied Lemma 2 to justify the
increase of the accepted amounts, first, from each j ∈ S−w
and now from j ∈ S′−w, due to the exit of w from the
auctions. We can apply Lemma 2 again and affirm that
p′j ≤ pj ∀j ∈ S, and in particular p′w ≤ pw, because of
the entrance of i.
We now find suitable lower and upper bounds to ensure
inequality uw(S
′) ≤ uw(S). First, note that J?(S) =∑
j∈S\w c
(pj)
j + c
(pw)
w ≤∑j∈S\w c(qj)j + c(p′w)w , where qj are
the cheapest allocation to procure (M − p′w) MW among
S \ w. By Lemma 2 we have %j ≥ qj ≥ pj ∀j ∈ S \ w ,
since pj ’s sum to (M − pw) ≤ (M − p′w) (due to p′w ≤ pw),
and %j ’s sum to M . Moreover, since (7b) holds and every
Bj satisfies (8), qj ’s are such that
∑
j∈S\w(%j − qj) = p′w,
because exactly M MW are purchased. Using the above
suboptimal allocation, we have a lower bound for uw(S):
uw(S) ≥
∑
j∈S\w
(c
(%j)
j − c(qj)j )− c(p
′
w)
w . (11)
Defining now δj = (%j − qj),∀j ∈ S \ w we must have∑
j∈S\w δj = p
′
w and J
?(S′−w) =
∑
j∈S\w c
(%′j)
j + c
(%′i)
i ≤∑
j∈S\w c
(p′j+δj)
j + c
(p′i)
i , since the right hand side is a
feasible cost to procure M MW among the participants
{S, i}\w. Indeed, ∑j∈S p′j+p′i = M and ∑j∈S\w δj = p′w.
Hence, we have:
uw(S
′) ≤
∑
j∈S\w
(c
(p′j+δj)
j − c
(p′j)
j ) + (c
(p′i)
i − c(p
′
i)
i )− c(p
′
w)
w .
(12)
Moreover, since Bj ’s satisfy (8), we have:
∀j ∈ S \ w (c(p
′
j+δj)
j − c
(p′j)
j ) ≤ (c(%j)j − c(qj)j ). (13)
The above holds because ∀j ∈ S \w , (%j−qj) = (p′j+δj−
p′j) = δj and p
′
j ≤ qj . In particular, p′j are the amounts
accepted to procure (M − p′w) MW among {S, i} \ w,
while qj are to procure the same MWs among S \ w.
Then, combining (12) , (13) and (11), we finally obtain
uw(S
′) ≤ uw(S). 2
Condition (8) on every participant’s bids hence is sufficient
to ensure that our VCG procurement auctions will always
have core outcomes. While we do not show here that the
condition is necessary, we illustrate that there are certainly
auctions where condition (8) is violated and for which
payoff monotonicity does not hold.
Example 2. Consider Example 1 where power plants PP1
and PP2 placed just one bid for 800 MW hence violating
condition (7b). It is easy to see that the payoffs of
each of the four winners are not monotonic. In fact, if
just one of them (e.g. PP3) was participating, he would
receive no payment; when PP4,PP5,PP6 enter the auction,
however, he becomes a winner hence making positive
profit. Suppose now that PP1 and PP2 bid accordingly
to (7b), but the bids B1 have a decreasing marginal cost:
B1 = ([200; 400; 600; 800], [12
′000; 25′000; 33′000; 40′000]),
B2 = ([200; 400; 600; 800], [12
′000; 24′000; 36′000; 50′000]).
In this case, when PP3 participates alone, he receives a
VCG payment of 40′000 − 33′000 = 7′000 CHF; when
PP4,PP5,PP6 enter the auction, however, he receives
12′000− 0 = 12′000 CHF.
As previously anticipated, we are now able to prove that
the condition derived also makes collusions and shill bid-
ding unprofitable. Therefore, the participants are better off
with their dominant strategies, which is truthful bidding.
Although the result is well-known in literature (Milgrom,
2004),(Ausubel et al., 2006) and motivates the choice of
the core as a competitive standard, we can now prove it
using the tools developed so far for the problem at hand.
Theorem 4. Consider a generic VCG auction (L,w) cleared
by (7). If ∀j ∈ L , Bj satisfies condition (8). Then,
(i) Any group of losing bidders cannot profit by jointly
lowering the bids.
(ii) Bidding with multiple identities is always unprof-
itable.
Proof. Recall that under condition (8) the participants
display payoff monotonicity (Theorem 3).
(i) Let C be a set of colluders who would lose the auction
when bidding their true values Bj = (c¯j , pj), while bidding
B˜j = (c˜j , pj) they become winners. Defining B = (Bj j ∈
C,B−C) and B˜ = (B˜j j ∈ C,B−C), the VCG payment
that each player j in C receives is
qj(B˜) = J
?(B˜−j)− J?(B˜) + c˜j>x?j (B˜)
≤ J?(B−C)− J?(B−C , B˜j) + c˜j>x?j (B−j , B˜j)
= J?(B−j)− J?(B−j , B˜j) + c˜j>x?j (B−j , B˜j),
where the first equality comes from definition of VCG
payment, the first inequality comes from the fact that
J?(B˜−j) − J?(B˜) ≤ J?(B−C) − J?(B−C , B˜j) since j dis-
plays payoff monotonicity and c˜j
>x?j (B˜) ≤ c˜j>x?j (B−j , B˜j)
because, when C \ j decrease their bids, less MWs are
being accepted from j (Lemma 2) and j is bidding with
increasing marginal cost. The last equality comes from
the fact that C originally was a group of non-winners.
Then, ∀j ∈ C, qj(B˜) is bounded by the payment that j
would receive when he is the only one lowering its bid. By
Theorem 1.a he will not face any benefit in doing so.
(ii) We denote with S ⊂ L multiple identities of the same
participant j¯. Since every participant bids accordingly to
(8), the outcome is guaranteed to lie in the core. Hence,
by Lemma 1 and substituting uj(B) = qj(B) − c>j x?(L),
we have:∑
j∈S
qj(L) ≤ J?(L \ S)− J?(L) +
∑
j∈S
c>j x
?
j (L),
where J?(L \ S) is the cost when S, or equivalently j¯,
is removed from the auction. Therefore, the total payment
that j¯ would receive is bounded by the one he would receive
bidding as a single participant. Making use of shills, hence,
is not profitable. 2
To confirm the previous theoretical results, we come
back to Example 1, where the TSO had to procure
a fixed amount of 800 MW. That is a simple auction
cleared by (7a). Suppose that now power plants PP1
and PP2 bid according to (7b) (with m = 200 MW)
and condition (8). The available bids are now: B1 =
([200; 400; 600; 800], [8′000; 19′000; 30′000; 40′000]), B2 =
([200; 400; 600; 800], [12′000; 24′000; 36′000; 50′000]), Bi =
(200, 0) i = 3, 4, 5, 6. The winners of the auction are still
power plants PP3,PP4,PP5,PP6 but now the VCG pay-
ments that they receive is qi(B) = 8
′000 − 0 = 8′000
CHF i = 3, 4, 5, 6. The total cost incurred by the TSO
is much lower than before and no coalition of players
now blocks the outcome. If PP3,PP4,PP5 and PP6 were
multiple identities of the same losing participant (i.e. a
power plant with true value greater than 40’000 CHF for
800 MW), shill bidding would become unprofitable (as
expected). If, moreover, they were losing participants who
jointly lowered their bids, the payments of 8’000 CHF
surely made at least one of them to have negative profit.
The diagram in Fig. 2 summarizes and links the concepts
we developed so far. Notice that Lemma 2, Theorem 3 and
Theorem 4 are specific for the class of auctions (7).
Fig. 2. Summarizing diagram of the relations of the results
3.3 Application to two-stage stochastic market
As we anticipated, the Swiss reserve market as described
in (Abbaspourtorbati and Zima, 2016) can be modeled
abstractly according to the optimization problem (2).
There are two stages of decision variables corresponding
to weekly (x) and daily (y) bids. Weekly bids are available
at the instance of optimization, whereas daily bids are
unknown. A number of stochastic scenarios corresponding
to likely possibilities of daily bids based on their past
values is used in the optimization ({yi}Ndi=1). The cost
function corresponds to the cost of weekly bids and the
expected cost of daily bids. Thus, the cost can be written
as c>x + D(x, y). The choice function determines the
accepted weekly bids.
The function g captures three types of constraints: (a)
those corresponding to procurement of certain amount
of tertiary reserves; (b) probabilistic constraints, which
ensure that with sufficiently high probabilities, the supply
and demand of power is balanced; (c) those corresponding
to conditional bids. Constraint (b) links the daily and
weekly variables. Constraints (a) and (c) correspond to
those present in the optimization formulation (7a).
It follows from the analysis of Section 2, that the VCG
mechanism applied to the two-stage stochastic market
is an incentive compatible dominant strategy mechanism
with socially efficient outcome. Due to coupling of the two
stage decision variables, the analysis of the core payment
is significantly more difficult. In particular, the result de-
rived in Theorem 3 do not readily apply. The amount
of procured MWs is not anymore fixed and thus (7b)
is not well defined. Selecting m infinitely small (forcing
participants to provide continuous bid curves) and lineariz-
ing the probabilistic constraints (b), however, we could
show that under condition (8) this clearing model follows
the same regularity property of Lemma 2. Whether this
makes all the participants display payoff monotonicity is a
subject of our current study. Nevertheless, in the numerical
example section, we evaluate the performance of the VCG
mechanism and compare it to the pay-as-bid mechanism.
4. SIMULATIONS AND ANALYSIS
The following simulations are based on the bids placed
in the 46th Swiss weekly procurement auction of 2014,
where 21 power plants bid for secondary reserves, 25 for
tertiary positive and 21 for tertiary negative reserves.
Note that the secondary reserves are symmetric, that is,
participants need to provide same amount of positive and
negative power. Tertiary reserves are on the other hand
asymmetric. Thus, participants bid for tertiary negative
TRL−, and tertiary positive TRL+. As in (Abbaspour-
torbati and Zima, 2016), probabilistic scenarios for future
daily auctions are assumed. The amount of daily reserves is
based on the data of the previous week. Three scenarios are
considered corresponding to nominal, high (20% higher)
and low prices (20% lower) compared to the previous week.
The corresponding outcome of the pay-as-bid mechanism
and the VCG mechanism is shown in Table 1. Note that in
reality, in a repeated bidding process, the VCG mechanism
would lead to different bidding behaviors, which we have
not modeled here.
Table 1. Outcome of the auction
SRL TRL- TRL+
Procured MWs 409 MW 114 MW 100 MW
Sum of pay-as-bid payments 2,29 million CHF
Sum of VCG payments 2,53 million CHF
Recall that in a pay-as-bid mechanism, a rational partici-
pant will overbid to ensure positive profit. Unfortunately,
it is hard to know the true values of the bids for each
participant. So, it is hard to have an accurate comparison
between the VCG and pay-as-bid based on past data. We
now scale all the bid prices down by 90%, assuming that
those were participants’ true values and hence the bids
that they would have placed under the VCG mechanism.
The outcome of both mechanisms is shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Outcome of the auction (scaled bids)
SRL TRL- TRL+
Procured MWs 409 MW 114 MW 100 MW
Sum of pay-as-bid payments 2,06 million CHF
Sum of VCG payments 2,28 million CHF
All the results are proportional (as it could be expected)
and the sum of VCG payments is lower than the sum
of pay-as-bid payments we had in the first scenario. This
means that assuming such scaled bids were participants’
true values, the VCG mechanism would have led to a lower
procurement cost than the implemented pay-as-bid mecha-
nism. Hence, the VCG mechanism, apart from leading to a
dominant strategy equilibrium with an efficient allocation,
would have been beneficial also in terms of costs, for this
particular case study based on the past data.
This does not happen in generic VCG auctions. In partic-
ular, the cost incurred by the auctioneer in a VCG auction
is usually higher than the cost under a pay-as-bid mecha-
nism, considering the same set of bids. To see this, recall
that the VCG payments are qj(B) = [J
?(B−j)−J?(B)] +
c>j x
?
j (B). These payments measure the benefit that each
participant brings to the auction. When the VCG pay-
ments are computed through the two-stage stochastic opti-
mization algorithm of (Abbaspourtorbati and Zima, 2016)
we observed that the costs are not significantly different
from the pay-as-bid mechanism. Intuitively, the two-stage
market softens the benefit that every participant brings
to the weekly auction: his accepted bids can always be
replaced by amounts of MWs allocated to the future. In
fact, the amounts of MWs bought in the weekly auction
are not fixed and they are flexible depending on the future
daily bids available in that week.
To confirm the intuition above, we now assume that we
had perfect information about the future daily auctions.
As such, we run a deterministic auction assuming that
the TSO already knew that the optimal amounts to be
purchased were 409 MW for SRL , 114 MW for TRL-
and 100 MW for TRL+ as predicted in Table 1 . Given
fixed MWs to be procured, the auction is cleared by
the simplified model (7a). In this case, naturally, we
have the same winners of the auction as the previous
case for both VCG and pay-as-bid mechanism. The VCG
payments however are significantly higher than the pay-
as-bid payments. The results are shown in Table 4.
Table 3. Outcome of the deterministic auction
SRL TRL- TRL+
Procured MWs 409 MW 114 MW 100 MW
Sum of pay-as-bid payments 2,06 million CHF
Sum of VCG payments 7,97 million CHF
The result can be explained as follows. When a winner j is
removed from the auction (to compute the term J?(B−j))
the amounts of MWs to be accepted among the other
participants originally were subject to flexibility due to two
stage decision variables and lack of a fixed total amount
for each type of reserve SRL, TRL-, TRL+. If these total
reserves are fixed for each type, the benefit that every
participant brings to the Swiss weekly auction is much
higher, and this results in higher VCG payments.
The mixed integer optimization problems were solved with
GUROBI, on a quad-core computer with processing speed
1.7 GHz and memory 4 Gb. The first two simulations had
a computation time of 9 min, with an average of 17 s for
each optimal cost J?. The last simulation took 7 min, with
an average of 14 s for each J?.
5. CONCLUSION
We developed a VCG market mechanism for electricity
markets, motivated by the set-up of the control reserves
(ancillary services) market. We showed that the mecha-
nism results in an incentive compatible dominant strategy
Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, this mechanism is socially
efficient. Through examples, we showed that shill bidding
can occur. We thus, derived conditions under which a
deterministic procurement mechanism can guarantee no
shill bidding and thus competitive outcomes. These find-
ings, both theoretical and empirical, act to support the
application of VCG mechanism for the electricity markets
under consideration. By removing incentives for collusion
and by providing a simple truthful mechanism, we expect
that the implementation simplifies the biding process,
increases markets efficiency and encourages participation
from increasing number of entities. We verified our results
based on market data available from Swissgrid. Future
work consists of deriving conditions under which Theorem
4 could be extended to the stochastic market.
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